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Krishna (1998) shows that a bilateral agreement between two countries render a 
multilateral agreement less attractive if the bilateral agreement is trade diverting. 
This paper combines Krishna’s model with the empirical approach of Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) to show that the estimated effect of tariffs in a multiple 
country (n>3) context over time measures trade diversion. We apply this measure to 
new asymmetric, time-varying Latin American trade and tariff data using Anderson 
and van Wincoop’s (2003) nonlinear estimation approach and OLS. The results 
show an increase in trade diversion as sub-regional trade agreements proliferated 
and enthusiasm for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas declined.
JEL: F02, F13, F15
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1.  Introduction
The 2005 Summit of the Americas adjourned without setting a date for 
further negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). While 
the FTAA may be resurrected, it is clear that enthusiasm for the agreement has 
declined precipitously from 1995, when the FTAA negotiations began. At the same 
time, bilateral agreements have proliferated throughout the Americas, raising the 4 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
possibility that bilateral agreements are stumbling blocks for multilateral accords1. 
The question of whether bilateral agreements are “building blocks” or “stumbling 
blocks” remains at the heart of the integration policy debate, and theory suggests 
that one key difference between these two outcomes is trade diversion: the degree 
to which bilateral agreements hinder multilateral negotiations depends on the 
extent of trade diversion created by the bilateral agreements. Unfortunately, there 
are few (if any) effective and practical measures of trade diversion in the multi-
country context.
Measuring trade diversion is important for policy for two reasons. First, as 
noted above, trade diversion makes multilateral agreements less attractive. Second, 
trade diversion is generally considered to be a risk of bilateral agreements because it 
is economically inefficient. Multilateral agreements avoid this inefficiency, making 
the policy choice between bilateral and multilateral agreements both relevant and 
dependent on being able to measure trade diversion.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The first is a measure of trade 
diversion that can easily be applied to the multi-country context. We begin with 
Krishna’s (1998) theoretical political economy model, which suggests that bilateral 
agreements can reduce the incentives to pursue multilateral negotiations in the 
presence of trade diversion. Implicit in his model is a metric for trade diversion that 
can be empirically applied to a multi-country environment by adapting Anderson 
(1979) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, henceforth AW). AW shows the 
importance of “multilateral resistance” measures in empirical studies. Trade between 
two countries, after controlling by size and other variables, is decreasing in their 
bilateral trade barrier relative to the average barrier of the two countries to trade 
with all their partners. While AW focus on the omitted variable bias that comes 
from ignoring multilateral resistance, we show that incorporating multilateral 
resistance can generate an alternative empirical metric for trade diversion that 
matches Krishna’s (1998) framework.
Our second contribution is the application of this approach to a new and 
unique data set on tariff rates. Studies of trade diversion have traditionally focused 
on discrete events, such as the entry into force of a trade agreement2. Rose (2004), 
in particular, finds that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has had very little, 
if any, effect on trade other than that generated from tariff changes. These results 
suggest that focusing on tariffs is a more appropriate way to focus on the effects 
of trade agreements.
Relatively few, however, have attempted to analyze the effects of preferential 
trade liberalization because the data requirements are considerable. To get the 
appropriate tariff data, one must examine each preferential trade agreement and 
record the tariff phase-in schedule, which is how we constructed the data used 
in this paper.
1  For examples of this debate, see Ethier (1998a, 1998b) and Krueger (1995).
2  Prominent examples include Romalis (2001), who focuses on NAFTA, and Rose (2004), who 
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We ground our empirical work by explicitly incorporating asymmetric tariff 
barriers into the familiar gravity model, following some recent empirical attempts 
to directly measure trade costs (Hummels, 2001a; Limao and Venables, 2001). 
Our data allow us to take advantage of the asymmetric nature of preferential tariffs 
among members of a preferential trade area in order to employ and enhance AW’s 
non-linear estimation approach. Baier and Bergstrand (2005), however, suggest 
that the OLS estimates are sufficient. We therefore use both approaches. The 
AW results have a smaller variance over time than the OLS estimates, but both 
approaches suggest rising trade diversion.
Combining these theoretic advances with a newly-constructed data set 
generates an approach that is intuitively straightforward. Falling average tariffs, 
such as through pursuing certain bilateral agreements, increases the trade-reducing 
effect of the remaining tariffs. Ceterus paribus, a bilateral agreement increases the 
difference between a country’s average tariff and the remaining tariffs. The trade 
diversion that drives Krishna’s (1998) model emerges as an increasingly negative 
estimated effect of remaining tariffs. That is, the remaining tariffs appear to become 
more effective at blocking trade as the bilateral agreement diverts trade from the 
pairs outside the agreements.
The Latin American experience between 1985 and 1997 provides an excellent 
opportunity to evaluate the link between bilateralism and multilateralism for two 
main reasons. First, negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
expected to have been completed in 2005, have bogged down. Simultaneous 
negotiations for bilateral agreements have been generating what has come to be 
known as the “spaghetti bowl” of bilateral agreements and reductions in preferential 
tariff rates. In few places has the question of whether bilateral agreements hinder or 
help multilateral trade negotiations been as relevant for policy as in Latin America 
over the last 15 years. Second, concentrating on a geographically defined region 
allows us to focus on the tariff effects and abstract somewhat from the multilateral 
resistance effects of distance.
Finally, having asymmetric tariff rates offers us the chance to make two 
additional contributions. First, while the majority of the literature uses average 
tariff rates under the assumption that tariff rates are basically symmetric, we show 
that, while trade flows are generally symmetric, tariff rates generally are not. 
Second, employing asymmetric tariffs also allows us to estimate the elasticity of 
substitution of goods between countries – a critical, but rarely estimated, parameter 
in many theoretic trade models.
Our study unfolds in six remaining sections. In Section 2 we present our 
data, discuss trade liberalization in the Americas, and highlight the importance of 
asymmetry in tariff data. In Section 3 we show how we combine Krishna and AW’s 
theoretic approaches. In Section 4 we describe our estimation approach. Section 
5 contains our results and we explore robustness in Section 6 before concluding 
in the final section.6 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
2.  Data and Stylized Facts
2.1  Summary Statistics
The major data collection effort of this paper involved constructing the 
preferential bilateral tariff rates for all possible bilateral relations among the 29 
countries included in our sample from original sources, in addition to the most-
favoured-nations (MFN) rates that each country applies to the rest of the world. The 
dataset used in this study covers the period from 1985 to 1997 and the following 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Japan, the United States, Canada, and the European 
Union. The standard gravity variables come from standard sources in the gravity 
literature, and in particular from Andrew Rose’s website. We have complemented 
these data with trade data from United Nations COMTRADE database. All MFN 
tariff data have been collected from official national statistical sources and regional 
integration secretariats. All preferential tariff data have been collected directly from 
original tariff schedules from regional and bilateral trade agreements (reciprocal and 
non-reciprocal) signed and implemented during the period under study. It includes 
bilateral and regional agreements signed under the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) framework; NAFTA agreement and other non-reciprocal 
agreements with the United States and the European Union. 
Table 1 contains the list of countries included in the data and some summary 
statistics. Several features deserve mention. As the list of countries shows, we 
focus on Latin America but include Canada, the United States, Europe, and Japan. 
The data exhibit the typical gravity model data characteristics in the sense that 
larger and closer countries trade more. Table 1 contains the average ad-valorem 
tariff rate, but we use log(1+tariff), -in which a 10% tariff would be 0.10- in our 
estimation. Due to our sample period, the tariff rates European countries have for 
each other and impose on non-European countries are identical for all countries 
within the European Union. We discuss the evolution of tariffs in Latin America 
in the next section.
2.2  Trade Liberalization in the Americas
Between 1985 and 1997, bilateral and sub-regional trade agreements 
proliferated throughout the Americas. Figure 1 illustrates what is now known 
as the “Spaghetti Bowl” of regional trade agreements. These agreements were 
often accompanied by unilateral trade liberalization. Our data cover this period 
of liberalization and the phase-in period. The data from our sample show falling 
simple average tariff rates (Figure 2). The decline begins in 1985. Average tariffs 
fall dramatically during the 1989-1991 period before leveling out around 1993. 
This decline in simple average tariffs reflects falling MFN tariff levels as well as 
falling preferential tariffs incorporated in bilateral agreements. Figure 3 shows the 
MFN tariff rates separately from the preferential tariff rates. The proliferation of 
bilateral agreements and falling average tariffs is evident in Figures 2 and 3.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 7
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS










Argentina 4.988 12.165 11.508 11.412 5219.30
Austria 5.069 12.084 9.796 14.573 3599.89
Bel-Lux 6.213 12.317 9.796 14.573 3319.59
Bolivia 1.336 8.700 11.057 10.966 4589.30
Brazil 6.259 13.121 11.281 10.659 4396.56
Canada 5.598 13.289 13.041 12.644 3859.19
Chile 4.777 10.610 11.603 11.221 5362.56
Colombia 4.254 11.011 11.251 10.923 4162.59
Germany 7.969 14.376 9.796 14.573 3514.26
Denmark 5.269 11.879 9.796 14.573 3531.74
Ecuador 2.486 9.644 10.794 10.238 4355.15
Spain 6.219 13.101 9.796 14.573 3310.81
Finland 4.886 11.674 9.796 14.573 3923.52
France 7.166 14.059 9.796 14.573 3923.52
Great Briton 7.104 13.840 9.796 14.573 3280.93
Greece 3.139 11.445 9.796 14.573 4016.96
Ireland 4.737 10.854 9.796 14.573 3286.33
Italy 7.081 13.874 9.796 14.573 3577.70
Japan 7.212 15.124 13.112 12.615 7606.15
Mexico 4.731 12.611 11.854 11.577 4741.56
Netherlands 6.457 12.688 9.796 14.573 3340.37
Peru 3.600 10.429 11.565 9.880 4664.74
Portugal 4.209 11.250 9.796 14.573 3296.30
Paraguay 1.219 8.787 11.025 10.943 4786.59
Sweden 5.935 12.342 9.796 14.573 3733.96
Uruguay 2.675 9.445 11.171 10.836 5212.52
United States 8.179 15.731 13.076 12.642 3880.63
Venezuela 4.016 11.137 11.474 11.350 3885.44
Notes: Trade and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are measured in U.S. dollars. The tariff is the average 
ad valorem tariff rate, and the standard deviation (St. Dev.) of the tariff rate is over time and country. 
These averages are over all countries and all years 1985-1997. Distance is measured in kilometers.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.
Bilateral and sub-regional agreements are, by definition, exclusive. The 
result of these agreements that differs from multilateral agreements is that the 
difference between the maximum tariff and the mean tariff rises with bilateral 
agreements. If multilateral resistance matters, then this suggests that, effectively, 
the remaining tariffs (for countries not included in the agreement) effectively rise 
(relative to the mean). This is exactly what happened in the Americas, as shown 
in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows both the standard deviation of importer tariff rates 
and the average difference between the mean and maximum tariff. Both rise as the 
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FIGURE 2
SIMPLE AVERAGE TARIFF RATES
Notes: This figure shows the simple (unweighted) annual average of the log of the tariff rate 
plus one in the data used in the empirical work.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.
Note: The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Calculations include only ad valorem tariffs.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.
FIGURE 3
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Notes: The standard deviation line graphs the annual average of the standard deviation 
of the log of one plus the tariff rate within importing countries. The “Max to Mean” 
ratio graphs the annual average of the maximum tariff divided by the mean tariff within 
importing countries.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.
above, suggests that the rising difference between average tariffs and the maximum 
tariff also affects trade between an importer and the country facing the maximum 
tariff – even if the maximum tariff does not change.
2.3  Asymmetry
One contribution of this paper is that it incorporates asymmetric tariff 
variables. Trade patterns are generally symmetric: countries that export a lot to a 
partner generally import a lot from that partner. This is true for our entire sample. 
Figure 5 illustrates this pattern for 1997 with a graph of country i’s exports and 
trade partner country j’s exports. The resulting coefficient (standard error) of the 
implied simple regression is 0.904 (0.025) with an adjusted R2 of 0.784. One 
country’s exports to a given partner explain about 80% of the variation of partner 
exports to the first country. This graph indicates that total trade is a very good 
proxy for unilateral trade.
Tariffs, in contrast, are generally not symmetric. Figure 6 illustrates this 
point for 1997 in which one country’s tariffs explain less than 40% of the variation Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 11
Log Exports Country j
 Fitted Values  45 degree line
 Exports Country i







THE SYMMETRY OF TRADE
Notes: The y-axis measures the log of exports for country j’s trading partner for 1997. 
The fitted values line is the predicted value of an OLS regression of the exports of 
country i on country j’s exports. The resulting coefficient (standard error) of that 
regression is 0.904 (0.025) with an adjusted R2 of 0.784.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.
in their partner’s tariffs towards them3. The symmetry of tariffs increases over our 
sample. Prior to 1990, one country’s tariffs explain less than 1% of the variation 
in the partner’s tariffs.
The implication of this asymmetry is that average trade barriers introduce 
possibly significant measurement error when they are used as proxies for partner-
specific tariffs. This measurement error would result in attenuation bias, biasing the 
estimated effects of tariffs towards zero, suggesting that the literature that relies on 
average tariffs underestimates the real impact of tariffs. This result also highlights 
the importance of asymmetric tariffs. As the theory in the next section shows, the 
estimated effect of these asymmetric tariffs measures trade diversion.
3.  Theory
Krishna (1998) employs a Cournot model to show that a bilateral agreement 
between two countries can make liberalizing with a third country (forming a 
multilateral agreement) less attractive if the bilateral agreement is trade diverting. 
3  The resulting coefficient (standard error) of the tariff regression is 0.616 (0.040) with an adjusted 
R2 of 0.390.12 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
One of AW’s main insights is that the concept of “multilateral resistance” affects 
trade patterns. In this section, we combine these contributions to illustrate how 
the “multilateral resistance” concept can be applied to Krishna’s basic approach 
to generate a metric of trade diversion.
We begin with the simplest form of a Cournot model4. Consider three 
countries, 1, 2, and 3. Defining exports from country i as qi and the constant 
marginal production cost in country i as gi, assume that 2’s demand for imports 
is simple and linear: P=1-Q in which Q=q1+q3. The Cournot solution for 2’s 



















4  Since this presentation is simply illustrative, we assume homogeneous goods, zero transportation 
costs, and benevolent governments, and abstract almost entirely from the consumption side and 
domestic production.
 
Tariff Rate Country j
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 Tariffs Country i







THE ASYMMETRY OF TARIFFS
Notes: The x-axis (y-axis) measures the log of one plus the tariff rate for country j 
(country i, country j’s trading partner) for 1997. The fitted values line is the predicted 
value of an OLS regression of the log of one plus the tariff rate of country i on the 
log of one plus country j’s tariff rate. The resulting coefficient (standard error) of that 
regression is 0.616 (0.040) with an adjusted R2 of 0.390.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 13
Tariffs that country 2 imposes on each trading partner can be modeled as a 
simple increase in marginal production costs. Thus, the trade-reducing effect of a 
tariff that country 2 imposes on country 1, for example, is a function of the tariff 
that country 2 imposes on country 3. That is, the effect of the tariff on bilateral trade 
is a function of the “multilateral resistance” that is represented here as country 2’s 
tariff on all other countries (which, in this case, includes just country 3).
Figure 7 graphs the effects of country 2’s imports from country 1 as a 
function of 2’s tariffs on imports from countries 1 and 3. When tariffs on imports 
from 3 are zero, higher tariffs on country 1 cause import (values) to fall, as the 
line in the facing plane (in the {trade,t1} space) shows. The effect of the tariff 
on imports from 1, however, is affected by 2’s tariff on country 3. Higher tariffs 
on imports from 3 reduce the trade-suppressing effect of tariffs on 1, which is 
due to the trade diverting effect of 2’s tariffs on 3. Higher tariffs on country 3 
divert trade from 3 to 1, making the tariff on 1’s exports less effective. Krishna’s 
(1998) insight is that trade diversion that occurs from bilateral tariff changes 
(e.g. through a bilateral trade agreement) reduce the gains from extending the 
agreement to third parties. This result is evident in Figure 7, and it illustrates 
both that the estimated effect of bilateral tariffs can reflect trade diversion and 
the importance of focusing on multilateral resistance measures in empirical 
























CROSS-TARIFF EFFECTS IN A SIMPLE 3-COUNTRY COURNOT MODEL
Notes: If country 2 imposes tariffs on countries 1 and 3 that are simply added to the production 
cost from each country ( g1 and g3 ), the demand for imports ( P*q1 ) from 1 as a function 
of tariffs on 1 and tariffs on 3.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.14 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
The standard empirical tool used to analyze trade volumes is the gravity 
model. The gravity model has a rich history and has recently experienced an 
important resurgence (e.g. Evenett and Keller 2002, Hanson and Xiang 2004). 
AW show that multilateral resistance can be easily incorporated into the gravity 
model. Their theoretic focus is on trade costs, which, in their empirical work, 
justifies a focus on the effects of distance. Here we focus on tariff component of 
trade costs. Following AW, a theoretically correct representation of the gravity 
model begins with the assumption that all goods are differentiated by place of 
origin. This assumption suggests that each country produces only one good. Since 
we are interested in aggregate goods’ flows, this assumption provides a reasonable 
starting point.
The second assumption is that consumers have identical, homothetic 
preferences that can be approximated with a CES utility function. AW, for example, 




i i ij c
() /( )/ /( ) 11 1 −− −
∑ ( )
which is maximized according to the budget constraint
(3)  pc y ij i ij j ∑ =
Define σ as the constant elasticity of substitution between goods from 
each country, βi as a positive consumption weight (summing over i to one), pij 
as the price of region i goods in country j, and finally yj as the nominal income 
of consumers in country j. Maximizing (2) subject to (3) generates the following 
demand5 for country i goods in country j:

















in which zp c ij ij ij =  represents country j’s imports from country i.
Since our focus is on tariffs, we next assume that tariffs are the only factors 
that affect the price (we incorporate distance shortly) and allow incomplete “pass 
through” from tariffs to prices captured by the coefficient η.
(5)  pp t ij ii j =
η
5  The complete derivation is included in the Appendix.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 15
We then follow Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998) who complete the 
derivation by noting that market clearance implies that each country’s income is 
equal to the sum of the production shipped to each country,
(6)  yz ii j j =∑ .
Defining world income as  y y
w
j j =∑  and income shares as θj j
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Our focus is not only on tariff levels, but the evolution of tariffs over time. 
Thus, we assume that distance is a fixed cost that acts as a demand “shifter” rather 
than a variable that causes a movement along the demand curve. Although differing 
somewhat from the current literature, we think this is a reasonable interpretation of 
the effects of distance in our context for several reasons. First, distance is symmetric 
and constant over time6. Second, countries that are far apart will consistently buy 
less from each other regardless of temporal deviations in price. That is, distance is 
less likely to cause a movement along the demand curve than a shift in the curve. 
Third, treating distance as a demand shifter allows us to focus on the effects of 
tariffs and to estimate the elasticity of substitution directly (as AW cannot do, but 
note is possible with asymmetric tariff data). We therefore define imports as exports 
minus a transportation cost7 (the traditional iceberg assumption):
6  Shipping costs may be neither constant nor symmetric (see Hummels 2001b). In fact, it is likely 
that they have declined over the long run. We therefore allow the effect of distance to change over 
time in our empirical work. 
7  We worried about the fact that we exclude the effects of average distance in this specification because 
this was one of the key contributions of AW. As we show in the robustness section, however, similar 
results emerge when the average distance variables are included in OLS regressions. We believe that 
this may be due to the fact that we focus on the Americas, which are geographically concentrated 
countries, and that we focus on the effects over time. Our solver refused to produce estimates when 
average distance was included multiplicatively with tariffs, which did not bother us too much because, 
as Hummels (2001b) points out, the interpretation of results generated by multiplying distance and 
tariffs seems problematic.16 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
(9)  ln ln ln() zxd ij ij ij =−
α .
Combining (7) and (9) and taking natural logs of both sides gives us our 
gravity model:
(10)  ln ln ln ln ln
()
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This specification suggests that both the level and overall average of tariffs 
affect trade volumes. This multilateral resistance approach suggests that not only 
do bilateral tariffs matter, but they matter when compared to average tariff levels. 
This result suggests an alternative metric for trade diversion. When two countries 
enter into a trade agreement and trade between them rises while trade between 
other partners falls, the tariffs that agreement countries have on third parties 
become more effective.
To illustrate this point, we calibrate the demand system (7)-(9) above for 
four countries (1,2,3,4) and examine how a reduction in 2’s tariff on 3 affects the 
trade between 2 and 1 for a range of 2 ‘s tariffs on country 1 ‘s goods. The results 

















Country 2 tariffs on 1







Notes: Results from a four-country simulation of the derived demand system in (7) and (8) in which 
η, yi, yj, and yw are set to one. A simple 3-country Cournot model, such as that postulated by Krisha 
(1998), exhibits similar properties. See Figure 1.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank based on official national sources.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 17
tariffs on 1 fall, trade between 1 and 2 increases, as expected. The trade-reducing 
effect of any given tariff 2 imposes on 1, however, depends on the tariff 2 imposes 
on 3. As 2 reduces tariffs on 3, trade between 1 and 2 falls and 2’s tariffs on 1 
become more effective in the sense that, at any given tariff level, trade is lower.
The intuition is very straightforward. In both the AW and Krishna models, 
lower tariffs on 3 cause 3’s exports to 2 to rise and 1’s exports to 2 to fall: trade is 
diverted from 1 to 3. The real effects of tariffs are therefore dependent on average 
tariffs, or the “multilateral resistance” generated by other tariffs. The changing 
effect of asymmetric specific tariffs therefore offers a metric of trade diversion.
This metric of trade diversion differs from other recent innovations in the 
literature. Romalis (2002) examines trade diversion by looking at how trade between 
Mexico, the United States, and Canada changed following the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by comparing trade between these countries 
and trade with Europe. This is a novel approach and works well when one wants 
to focus on a trade agreement. In the Americas, most bilateral agreements have 
prolonged “phase-in” periods that suggest that focusing on asymmetric tariffs is 
important.
4.  Estimation Strategy
Our basic strategy begins by specifying a stochastic form of (10):
(11)  ln ln ln ln () ln xk yy dt ij ij ij ij =+ ++ +− − ασ η 1
–( )ln()ln 11 −− −+ σσ QP e ij ij
AW suggest that the most theoretically consistent approach to estimating 
these parameters would be to find the η, σ, α, and a constant term k, that solve 
the following nonlinear optimization problem8:
(12)  min ln ln ln ln (
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8  The second condition differs from (8) because we substitute (5) and assume that goods are evenly 
weighted across countries (the betas are identical for all countries and sum to one).18 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
Baier and Bergstrand (2005) argue that the nonlinear optimization approach 
is unnecessary when using the gravity model to resolve the “border puzzle” 
and other issues. Their derivation, however, like AW, assumes symmetric trade 
costs. When tariffs are asymmetric, as in our case, it is not clear that their OLS 
approach is similar to the nonlinear optimization approach. In the results section, 
we begin with results generated from solving this problem and then compare the 
solver results with those generated by unconstrained and constrained OLS and 
show how the estimates of the tariff effect change when average tariffs (and other 
variables) are added.
5.  Empirical Results
Table 2 contains the results from the minimization problem described in (12) 
and (13). Our data range from 1985-1997, and we calculated parameter estimates 












1985 –13.715 –1.041 1.391 1.198
1986 –0.516 –1.852 14.201 –1.225
1987 –0.647 –1.878 10.972 –1.237
1988 –0.962 –1.889 8.744 –1.244
1989 –0.589 –2.092 4.783 –1.216
1990 –0.731 –2.263 3.505 –1.217
1991 –3.051 –1.700 8.108 –1.344
1992 –3.980 –1.686 6.551 –1.375
1993 –7.325 –1.377 5.896 –1.508
1994 –6.406 –1.464 6.927 –1.454
1995 –5.513 –1.518 7.392 –1.428
1996 –6.455 –1.394 7.663 –1.485
1997 –119.663 –0.148 11.116 –1.938
85-87 –1.068 –1.454 2.542 –1.630
88-90 –0.754 –2.137 4.078 –1.230
91-93 –4.042 –1.660 7.530 –1.371
94-96 –6.230 –1.421 7.170 –1.473
97 –119.663 –0.148 11.116 –1.938
Notes: Tariff coefficients and their standard errors were also calculated using bootstrapping. The coef-
ficients were found to increase over time, ranging from –3.973 to –51.122. The standard errors also 
increased over time, ranging from 0.039 to 2.008.
Source: Own estimations.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 19
not report standard errors for our estimates9. Several interesting results emerge 
from Table 2. The elasticity of substitution estimates are greater than one in all 
years. The distance estimates are negative (as expected), rise (in absolute value) 
between 1985 and 1990, and fall (in absolute value) between 1990 and 1997.
With the exception of 1985, all of the estimates of the effects of tariffs are 
negative. The tariff estimates are generally in the range of, albeit on the high side, 
estimates found elsewhere in the literature. Unlike the distance estimates, they 
increase (in absolute value) after 1990. The growing effect of tariffs over time is 
consistent with the idea of growing trade diversion. The absolute values of the 
tariff effect are larger after 1990, the year that many of these bilateral agreements 
began to go into effect, than in the years 1986-1990. To the extent that Krishna’s 
model applies to the Americas, these results are consistent with rising trade diver-
sion contributing to the falling enthusiasm for the FTAA.
In addition to the annual estimates, the table also contains results from 
solving the model with pooled data. We solved the model pooling data over 1985-
87, 1988-90, 1991-1993, 1994-1996, and 1997 to get an idea of the sensitivity 
to changes in sample period. Like the earlier results, the estimated tariff effect 
rises consistently between 1988 and 1997, which, again, is consistent with rising 
trade diversion.
6.  Robustness
Our estimation approach follows AW, but diverges somewhat from the gravity 
model literature that generally relies on cross section and/or OLS estimation. To 
explore the robustness of our estimation approach and results, we also present 
cross-section and panel OLS estimates. The gravity model that is more likely to 
be found in the literature might look something like:
(14)  ln ln ln ln ln xk yydt ij ijij ij it =+ ++++ ββ ββ β 12 34 5Φ+ + eij
in which β5 is actually a vector of parameters that reflect the effects of the vari-
ables contained in Φ. These variables may include controls for common borders, 
languages, or other characteristics, but has not traditionally contained controls 
for average tariff levels.
One important difference between this specification and equation (11) is the 
interpretation of the coefficient on the tariff variable. In most of the gravity model 
literature that includes tariff estimates, the coefficient on tariffs in equation (14) 
is interpreted as the direct effect of tariffs (that is, as η). Without the appropriate 
multilateral resistance terms and corresponding theoretical foundation, most 
gravity specifications abstract from the elasticity of substitution component. 
In the solver approach, however, it is possible to separate the two terms. In the 
9  One reason the gravity model is so heavily used is that statistical significance of the main variables 
is rarely an issue. Our OLS estimates, described in the next section, show no cause for concern about 
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results that follow, we follow the convention in the gravity literature (for the sake 
of comparability) and interpret β5 as η.
Table 3 contains the results from 5 different gravity specifications. All five 
columns contain OLS estimates using the log of exports as the dependent variable. 
For these results, we pooled data from 1985 to 199710. We begin with the most basic, 
column (1), specification that includes (natural logs of) the tariff rate (1+tariff), 
distance, the GDP of each partner (importer and exporter), and a constant term. 
In the second column we add dummy variables that traditionally appear in gravity 
models that account for a common border, either being landlocked, either being 
an island, and having a common language. In the third column we exclude these 
dummy variables but include the average tariff rate of each country. In the fourth 
column, we include both the average tariff rates of each country and the traditional 
dummie variables. The final column excludes these traditional variables but adds 
the average distance to the rest of the world for each country.
The results in the first column seem to suggest the importance of the excluded 
multilateral resistance measures. The estimates of distance and the GDP of each 
country are consistent with prior expectations, but the tariff effect is positive. When 
the traditional gravity model variables are included in column (2), the tariff effect 
becomes negative, as expected, perhaps suggesting that these variables are correlated 
with the country-specific effects of average tariffs and therefore may pick up some 
of their effect. Note that their inclusion has little effect on the other variables and, 
with the exception of being an island, they all are statistically significant.
When we replace the traditional variables with the average tariff rate, we find 
an estimate of the tariff effect that is much larger (in absolute value) than our solver 
estimate, while, again, our other estimates change little. Including the traditional 
gravity variables with our average tariff rate generates a still larger estimate of the 
tariff effect but has only a small effect on the average tariff effect estimates, as seen 
in column (4). Finally, column (5) shows that a similar tariff effect estimate emerges 
when we include the average distance measures along with the average tariff measures. 
The main point from this table is that multilateral resistance measures matter in the 
sense that including them affects the tariff effect estimates.
In addition to multilateral resistance, theory also implies several constraints. 
Moving closer to theory, Table 4 contains the constrained OLS estimates in four 
columns. In the first column, we constrain the coefficient on the income terms 
to equal one. In the second column, we constrain the coefficients on the average 
tariff variables to be equal to each other. In the third column, we constrain the 
income coefficients to equal one and include country specific (not pair specific) 
fixed effects11. In the last column, we constrain the income variables to one and 
the average tariff variable coefficients to equal each other.
10  This period is chosen to be comparable with the pooled solver results. We also discuss year-by-
year results shortly.
11  We do not include pair-specific fixed effects for several reasons. First, the theory suggests that the 
multilateral resistance measures are country-specific, implying country-specific fixed effects. Second, 
perhaps not surprisingly, we do not get significant estimates when including pair-specific fixed effects, 
since the pair-specific fixed effects results are identified from purely time-series variation, which is 
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The results in the first column suggest that just constraining the income 
terms to equal one generates larger tariff effects to those generated with the solver. 
The average tariff coefficients suggest elasticities of substitution that are close to 
those generated from the solver12. Constraining the average tariff coefficients to 
be equal generates a somewhat smaller tariff effect. The distance coefficient is 
not affected by the change in constraints.
12  Based on the Q and P coefficients in equation (10), if b is the coefficient estimate and s is the 
elasticity of substitution, then b=-(1-s), implying a range of estimates of the elasticity of substitution 
of 3.935 to 7.144.
TABLE 3
CROSS SECTION ESTIMATES














Log(1+(Tariff/100)) 0.654 –0.313 –4.946 –9.490 –5.673
(0.129)*** (0.132)** (0.792)*** (0.790)*** (0.859)***
Ln Distance –1.195 –1.053 –1.080 –0.844 –1.113
(0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)***
Ln Real Gdp Exporter 0.969 0.939 0.846 0.799 0.848
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Ln Real Gdp Importer 0.846 0.796 0.975 0.948 0.986
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Common Border 0.725 0.822
(0.048)*** (0.048)***
Either Is Landlocked –0.656 –0.670
(0.032)*** (0.032)***
Either Is An Island 0.039 –0.003
(0.030) (0.029)
Common Language 0.175 0.200
(0.030)*** (0.030)***
Log Avg Exp Tariff 3.122 3.436 2.472
(0.353)*** (0.341)*** (0.359)***
Log Avg Imp Tariff 5.168 8.591 5.956
(0.770)*** (0.759)*** (0.858)***
Ln Avg Dist Reporter World 0.680
(0.067)***
Ln Avg Dist Partner World 0.130
(0.075)*
Constant –7.333 –7.388 –8.576 –9.468 –15.141
(0.157)*** (0.181)*** (0.215)*** (0.241)*** (0.812)***
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709
R-squared      0.83      0.84      0.83      0.84      0.83
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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When fixed effects are included, however, the tariff estimate falls dramatically 
to about 6% of the estimate in column (2). To the extent that including the multilateral 
tariff resistance measures generates similar estimates to those generated by the 
solver and these are closer to the “correct” estimates, the results in column (3) 
suggest that country-specific fixed effects are a poor substitute for multilateral 
resistance variables when tariffs are asymmetric.
In the final column, we apply all three constraints (each income coefficient 
is equal to one and the coefficients on the average tariff variables equal to each 
other). The resulting estimate of the tariff effect is the estimate in Table 4 that is 
most similar to the solver estimates. Changing the constraints and/or including 
fixed effects seems to have little effect on the estimate of the distance variable.
One key difference between the estimates presented in Tables 3 and 4 and 
the solver estimates is that the OLS estimates are not presented year-by-year. To 
investigate changes over time, we pool the data over time and include interaction 
terms for each year between 1985 and 1997 (leaving out 1988 as the reference year). 
These years mirror Figure 3 by capturing the different periods of trade liberalization 
in the Americas. The estimated coefficients on the tariff-year interactions suggest a 
growing negative effect of tariffs over time. The coefficient on the 1997 interaction 
term shows that the tariff effect in 1997 is statistically significantly larger (in absolute 
TABLE 4









Log(1+(Tariff/100)) –4.894 –3.191 –0.193 –2.129
(0.810)*** (0.404)*** (0.145) (0.410)***
Ln Distance –1.081 –1.117 –1.215 –1.140
(0.021)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)***
Ln Real Gdp Exporter 1.000 0.974 1.000 1.000
(0.007)***
Ln Real Gdp Importer 1.000 0.845 1.000 1.000
(0.007)***
Log Avg Tariff Exporter 2.935 3.387 3.349
(0.360)*** (0.338)*** (0.345)***
Log Avg Tariff Importer 6.144 3.387 3.349
(0.786)*** (0.338)*** (0.345)***
Constant –10.812 –8.283 –9.268 –10.377
(0.176)*** (0.183)*** (0.123)*** (0.137)***
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The 
first column’s regression included the constraint that the income coefficients equal one. The second 
column’s regression constrained the average tariff coefficients to be equal. The regression in the third 
column includes country-specific fixed effects and constrains the income coefficients to equal one. 
The last column’s regression constrains the income coefficients to equal one and the average tariff 
coefficients to equal each other.
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value) than the tariff effect in 1988. In both columns 1 and 2 the tariff effects are 
statistically different at the 1% level, while in the third regression the tariff effects 
are statistically different at the 10% level. Additionally, since the coefficient on 
the 1997 interaction term in the third regression has the correct sign as predicted 
by theory, it is appropriate to conduct a one-sided t-test. Based on the one-sided 
test, the tariff effects are statistically different at the 5% level. In other words, there 
was a statistically and economically significant increase in trade diversion between 
1988 and the end of the 1990s as subregional agreements proliferated.
Figure 9 presents the estimates of the tariff effects from year-by-year OLS 
regressions. We graph coefficients from annual estimates of equation 1 from Table 
3 and equations 3 and 4 from Table 4 along with the solver estimates of the tariff 
effect. The “base” regression (the first equation in Table 3) generates increasingly 
positive tariff effects. Adding the multilateral variables, such as from equation 4 in 
Table 4, generates negative tariff effects that are at least 2-3 times larger in absolute 
value than the solver estimates. Including fixed effects generates negative tariff 
effects that are larger than the multilateral estimates, but exhibit a similar variance 
FIGURE 9
COMPARISON OF TARIFF EFFECTS 
Notes: Each line represents coefficient estimates on the log tariff variable in year-by-year regressions. 
The “Base” regression also includes distance and income of each country. The “Cons Fixed FX” also 
contains country fixed effects and constrains the income coefficients to equal one. The “Cons Multilat” 
replaces the country fixed effects with average tariff rates for each country and constrains their coef-
ficients to be equal (income coefficients were also constrained to be one). The “Solver Est” line graphs 
the results from solving the Anderson-van Wincoop type problem as described in the text.
Source: Own estimations.24 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
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(94 Dummy)*Log(1+(Tariff/100)) –2.611 –3.503 –1.210
(0.936)*** (0.935)*** (0.956)
(95 Dummy)*Log(1+(Tariff/100)) –2.847 –3.308 –0.886
(0.920)*** (0.924)*** (0.948)
(96 Dummy)*Log(1+(Tariff/100)) –3.298 –3.851 –1.439
(0.950)*** (0.953)*** (0.976)
(97 Dummy)*Log(1+(Tariff/100)) –2.917 –4.056 –1.643
(0.965)*** (0.954)*** (0.977)*
Ln Distance –1.140 –1.137 –0.969
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)***
Ln Real Gdp Exporter 0.152 1.000 1.000
(0.063)** . .
Ln Real Gdp Importer 0.729 1.000 1.000
(0.071)*** . .
Log Avg Tariff Exporter 9.578
(0.923)***
Log Avg Tariff Importer 9.578
(0.923)***
Constant 4.088 –9.442 –12.354
(1.191)*** (0.132)*** (0.310)***
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The first 
column’s regression included country–specific fixed effects and no constraints. The second column’s 
regression included country–specific fixed effects and constrains the income coefficients to equal 
one. The last column’s regression included country–specific fixed effects and constrains the income 
coefficients to equal one and the average tariff coefficients to equal each other.
Source: Own estimations.Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion 25
(the annual changes are similar). The equations with the multilateral resistance 
effects show a growing (negative) effect of tariffs over time that matches the falling 
average tariffs and rising difference between the mean and average tariffs that is 
consistent with trade diversion. The solver estimates result in the most moderate 
increase in the effect of tariffs and the one with the smallest overall variance in 
annual changes. Overall, however, the results all suggest rising trade diversion 
throughout the 1990s.
7.  Conclusions
Policymaker and academics alike have been engaged in a vigorous debate 
over the best way to achieve economic integration. The two main approaches are 
multilateral negotiations and expanding bilateral negotiations. The relative success 
of the GATT and the WTO over the last 50 years reveals the potential benefits 
from multilateral negotiations. While both may occur simultaneously, our results 
suggest that allowing or pursuing bilateral negotiations reduces the potential 
gains from multilateral negotiations because we find evidence of trade diversion, 
which is generally believed to be economically inefficient and reduces the gains 
from multilateral negotiations. Krishna (1998) and others have suggested that 
bilateral agreements can hinder multilateral agreements. Since the overall gains 
from multilateral agreements are potentially quite large (Brown et al. 2003), 
understanding how bilateral agreements affect multilateral negotiations is a critical 
question for policy.
Specifically, we do this by combining two important contributions. We 
show how Krishna’s insights can be incorporated into the gravity model using 
the multilateral resistance approach implemented by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003). By adapting this approach to asymmetric tariffs, we illustrate how this 
concept can be used to help measure trade diversion in the multilateral context. 
Our results suggest that omitted average tariff levels create an important omitted 
variable bias in gravity models. Including these measures can help illustrate the 
potential effects of trade diversion that occur when countries pursue bilateral 
agreements.
We apply this approach to Latin America. Latin America is particularly 
appropriate to address this question because the recent proliferation of bilateral 
agreements has coincided with declining enthusiasm for further multilateral 
liberalization. Using several different estimation approaches, we find significant 
evidence of an increasing tariff effect that is consistent with trade diversion. 
These results are consistent with Krishna’s suggestion that bilateral agreements 
that induce trade diversion can reduce the incentives to pursue multilateral trade 
agreements.
Our paper is consistent with other recent work on regionalism in Latin 
America that shows that the rise of bilateralism is not necessarily a negative 
development. Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008) suggest that as countries 
adopt bilateral agreements, they also tend to reduce product-specific MFN tariffs. 26 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
They suggest that this behavior could be an attempt by governments to avoid or 
offset the trade-diverting effects of bilateral agreements, such as the kind we find 
in this paper. Furthermore, by understanding the potential and actual trade diverting 
effects of bilateral agreements, governments can address the potential problems in 
ways that effectively spread free trade throughout the region, such as described by 
Estevadeordal, Harris, and Suominen (2007) in the context of Rules of Origin.
It is important to highlight what we do not show with our results. We do 
not show that the increase in trade diversion explains the lack of enthusiasm for 
the FTAA. Linking the rise in trade diversion with the potential welfare effects of 
the FTAA would involve country-specific analysis beyond the scope of this paper, 
and therefore is left for future research. In the meantime, however, documenting 
changes in trade diversion is a potentially important first step towards effective 
trade policies in the region.
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Appendix
DERIVATION OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Following the specification of Anderson and van Wincoop (2000), a 
theoretically correct representation of the gravity model begins with the assumption 
that all goods are differentiated by place of origin. This assumption suggests that 
each country produces only one good. At this stage, in which we are interested 
in the affect of average tariff levels on aggregate flows of goods, this assumption 
provides a reasonable starting point.
The second assumption is that consumers have identical, homothetic 
preferences that can be approximated with a CES utility function. Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2000), for example, specify the following function for consumers 
in country j consuming goods z from country i:
(A1)    β
σσ σσ σσ
i i ij z
() /( )/ /( ) 11 1 −− −
∑ ( )
which is maximized according to the budget constraint
(A2)    pz y ij i ij j ∑ = .
Define σ as the constant elasticity of substitution between goods from 
each country, βi as a positive consumption weight (summing over i to one), pij as 
the price of region i goods in country j , and finally yj as the nominal income of 
consumers in country j.
(A3)    Lz yp z ii j i
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Next we drop the j by just looking at the maximization problem for people 
in country j .

















Maximize (A4) by taking the derivative with respect to each zi. For each 
i we get
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Recall that U z j i i i = ( )
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which can be written as
















The next step is to sum over all N goods which will allow us to simplify 
the problem because the terms in red cancel out:




















so that we are left with
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From (8) we can now see that
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Collecting the y terms to the left and the z terms to the right, we get
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Raising both sides to the power of σ generates the following result.
(A14)   yp z ii i βλ
σσ σ 11 −− =
Multiply both sides by  pi
1−σ  and sum again over all N goods to get





σσ σ 11 1 −− − ∑∑ =
Once again, the terms cancel out when the consumer optimizes, giving us 
an expression for the lambda term…





11 1 −− − ∑ =
…that we put into (A14) to get our demand function. This is country j’s demand 
function for goods produced by country i . For the sake of intuition, assume that the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one. Then imports from country i (defined 
as zipi ) are a decreasing function of the own price and an increasing function of 
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To complete the derivation of the gravity model, it is first necessary to 
incorporate the effects of distance and tariffs. We first illustrate the Anderson and 
van Wincoop approach. They define a generic trade cost factor tij that is multiplied 
by the exporter’s price pi , such that pij = pitij . They then note that the general 
equilibrium structure of the model implies
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We simplify (A21) by defining










Putting the resulting expression for βipi into (A17) generates the gravity 
model that we use for estimation:
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